The Justices Trump Appointed Just Ruled Against Him — and Constitutional Conservatives Should Be Grateful

Conservative legal scholars have spent decades building the intellectual infrastructure for textualism and originalism. The Federalist Society was founded in 1982 on exactly this premise: that the Constitution means what it says, that Congress is the legislative branch, and that executive power has limits even when a president of your preferred party is exercising it. It would be awkward — to put it charitably — to abandon that framework the moment it produced an inconvenient result. [3]

Gorsuch and Barrett held firm. This will irritate some Trump loyalists, and that irritation is worth examining. The argument that the justices "betrayed" the president who appointed them misunderstands the entire point of judicial independence — and, frankly, the entire point of the conservative legal project. You don't build a 40-year movement for constitutional fidelity only to invoke it selectively. Principles are not rhetorical devices. They are, or they aren't. [3]

IEEPA's authority to 'regulate... importation' does not extend to setting tariffs, which are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration. The constitutional assignment of the tariff power to Congress is not ambiguous.

— Chief Justice John Roberts, majority opinion, Learning Resources v. Trump (2026)

It is worth noting, parenthetically, that principled consistency seems to be in short supply these days. Some of our more idealistic colleagues in the press appear to believe that institutions should apply their stated values without exception — until, of course, those values become financially or politically inconvenient. Conservatives have always maintained that rules must apply equally, in every season. This ruling is a useful reminder of what that actually looks like in practice.

The Policy Lives On

Here is where the conservative case for the ruling gets practical, not just philosophical. The Trump administration, within hours of the decision, pivoted to a 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a congressional statute that does authorize presidential tariff authority, for up to 150 days. The policy did not die; it simply relocated to a legitimate legal foundation. That is how the system is supposed to work. [4]

The broader America First trade agenda — protecting domestic manufacturing, reducing dependence on adversarial supply chains, pressuring trading partners who have taken advantage of U.S. open markets for decades — does not require IEEPA to survive. It requires Congress to act. Republicans hold the House and Senate. If tariffs are the right policy (and there is a reasonable conservative case that some of them are), then the vehicle is a statute, not an emergency declaration. The Court simply made that path the only path. [4]

The Separation-of-Powers Dividend

Conservatives should think carefully about what a contrary ruling would have meant. An IEEPA-based tariff power — unbounded, unlimited in duration, not subject to congressional override absent a supermajority — is a template. It is a template that the next Democratic president would inherit in full. Every expansion of executive authority that feels useful in 2025 becomes a weapon available to the other side in 2029. This is not a hypothetical. It is the history of the administrative state, repeated without variation every 8 to 16 years. [5]

The intellectual tradition that produced Gorsuch and Barrett — Scalia's legacy, the originalist movement's four decades of patient institution-building — rests on exactly this insight. Limited executive power protects conservative governance as much as it constrains it. A president who can declare economic emergencies without congressional authorization is a feature when your party holds the White House and a catastrophic vulnerability every other Tuesday.

The Road Ahead

The practical fallout from the ruling is manageable. Importers who paid IEEPA-based tariffs may now pursue refunds through the Court of International Trade. The administration has alternative statutory authority. The State of the Union, coming tomorrow night, will give the president a platform to reframe his economic agenda on terrain that is now, at minimum, legally defensible. [1]

The constitutional fallout, on the other hand, is clarifying — and overdue. Learning Resources v. Trump restores Congress to its proper role as the author of trade law. It applies the major questions doctrine to foreign economic policy, a domain where presidential claims to implied authority have grown expansive over several administrations, not just this one. And it demonstrates, usefully, that the justices appointed by this president are not ideological servants. They are judges. [2]

Some conservatives will spend the next several weeks complaining about the ruling. That is their prerogative. But the conservative legal movement spent forty years arguing that the Constitution is not a living document to be bent toward convenient conclusions. Last Thursday, two of the movement's most prominent products proved they were listening. That is not a betrayal. That is the whole point.

• The 6-3 ruling held that IEEPA does not authorize presidential tariffs — Congress retains Article I tariff power
• Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined the majority, applying consistent textualist principles regardless of political outcome
• The Trump administration quickly pivoted to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, preserving near-term tariff policy
• Affected importers may now seek refunds through the Court of International Trade
• The ruling closes a dangerous precedent that future administrations (of either party) could have exploited