Three justices dissented — Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh — and Kavanaugh's dissent is worth reading. He argues that tariffs are historically a traditional tool for regulating importation, that presidents have broad foreign affairs authority, and that the major questions doctrine should not apply in this context. He makes a legitimate case. But he also, pointedly, acknowledges that the ruling "might not substantially constrain a president's ability to order tariffs going forward" because numerous other statutes authorize exactly that [1]. For those hoping the Court had finally boxed in executive trade authority, Kavanaugh's dissent is a cold bucket of water. Even the dissenters see the off-ramps.

The Pivot: America First Trade Policy Through the Back Door — And the Front Door

The Trump administration's response was swift and, frankly, well-prepared. The same day the ruling dropped, the president issued three executive orders: one terminating the IEEPA tariffs, one invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a 10% global import surcharge effective February 24th, and one confirming the continued suspension of de minimis duty-free treatment for small shipments [2]. Section 122 gives the president authority to address "large and serious" balance-of-payments deficits with import surcharges of up to 15%, for up to 150 days. The administration's economists found that the United States' balance-of-payments position is, under any reasonable calculation methodology, a large and serious deficit — including because the annual balance on primary income turned negative for the first time since at least 1960 in 2024 [2]. Whether that specific application of Section 122 will survive legal challenge is an open question. But the tariff is in effect today.

More significantly for the long term, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has launched a new wave of Section 301 investigations. Section 301 — used by Trump in his first term to impose tariffs on China — allows the administration to target foreign practices that are "unreasonable" or "discriminatory" and burden U.S. commerce [3]. The investigations underway cover industrial excess capacity, forced labor, pharmaceutical pricing practices, digital services taxes, seafood trade practices, and more. Unlike Section 122, Section 301 tariffs carry no 150-day expiration and no 15% rate ceiling. If those investigations produce findings — and USTR has said it intends to move on an accelerated timeline — the administration could reconstruct much of the IEEPA tariff structure under a legal framework that has already withstood court scrutiny [3]. The 2026 USTR Trade Policy Agenda makes the administration's intentions clear. It calls for doubling down on the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade program, pursuing robust Section 232 national security duties on critical sectors, and continuing to use trade policy as leverage to reduce foreign market barriers [4]. The legal vehicle changed. The destination did not.

The United States plays a pivotal role in shaping the global economy. At the same time, the United States faces various threats to its own economy and national interests.

— President's 2026 Trade Policy Agenda, USTR

What Constitutional Conservatives Should Actually Think

Here's the part that some on the right will resist hearing: the Court was right. Not right to celebrate — and not right in a way that should comfort the progressive economists who are currently writing op-eds about the death of tariff policy. But right on the constitutional principle. The power to tax is the power of the purse. The Framers gave that power to Congress specifically because taxation without representation was the grievance that started the whole American project. IEEPA was designed to freeze assets, block financial flows, and restrict transactions during genuine emergencies. It was not designed — and had never been used — as a presidential switch for rewriting the entire tariff code. True conservatism means taking constitutional structure seriously even when the result is inconvenient. The Roberts majority, in relying on the major questions doctrine and the constitutional framework, applied a principle that conservatives should find familiar: if Congress wants to delegate an extraordinary power, it has to say so clearly. IEEPA did not say so clearly. The president had no explicit tariff authority under that statute. Full stop.

Some conservative commentators have treated the ruling as an outrage. It isn't. What would be an outrage is if the administration had simply ignored the Court, or if the legal architecture of the trade agenda were so dependent on one statute that a single ruling could collapse the entire program. Neither is true. The administration complied with the ruling immediately, pivoted to alternative authorities with remarkable speed, and kept the core trade posture intact. That is the correct response to a separation-of-powers question from the judiciary. The more interesting constitutional argument — one that some observers are already raising — is what happens if Congress steps in. Republican lawmakers are reportedly exploring statutory codification of reciprocal tariff authority, which would put the trade agenda on the firmest possible legal foundation. That is precisely the process the Constitution envisions: if the executive wants a power, Congress can grant it explicitly. That's not a limitation on America First trade policy. That's the system working.

What Happens Next

The 150-day clock on Section 122 expires in late July 2026. By then, the Section 301 investigations should be producing results — and some of them, particularly those targeting China's industrial overcapacity and forced labor practices, have strong legal precedent behind them. Section 232 national security tariffs on steel, aluminum, copper, vehicles, and now critical minerals remain in effect and were not touched by the IEEPA ruling [3]. The bilateral trade agreements the administration negotiated — the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade framework with multiple countries — are on more uncertain legal footing, since many of their provisions referenced IEEPA tariff rates. But the administration has leverage: countries that walked away from their ART commitments would face a fresh wave of Section 301 investigations with no rate cap and no expiration. Most trading partners will conclude that compliance is the better path. The trade war is not over. The tariff regime is not dead. The legal architecture just got rebuilt on sturdier ground — which, for a policy agenda that conservatives hope will outlast any particular administration, is not the worst outcome. Legal clarity now means durability later.

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court's February ruling was not a defeat for American trade policy. It was a course correction on the legal mechanism — one the administration saw coming and had already planned around. The 10% global tariff is in effect. The Section 301 investigations are underway. The Section 232 national security duties remain. The 2026 trade agenda is fully operational. The IEEPA chapter is closed. The America First trade story has several chapters left. Those who thought a Supreme Court ruling would end the era of muscular American trade policy will need to find something else to celebrate. The mission continues — it just comes with better legal documentation now.