Operation Epic Fury and the War Powers Amnesia Epidemic

The Biggs Problem (Or: How Principles Become Inconvenient)

In 2019, Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ) co-founded the Congressional War Powers Caucus alongside liberal Rep. Ro Khanna of California. The stated mission: "restoring Congress's constitutionally-mandated authority over matters of war and peace." In 2024, Biggs posted on X that "Biden's airstrikes in Yemen blatantly violate Article 1 of our Constitution. He cannot unilaterally pull us into another war." On March 5th, 2026, Biggs voted against a resolution that would have directed the president to remove U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran. His explanation: "The president's actions were limited and strategic, consistent with longstanding precedent used by both Republican and Democrat administrations. Targeted military operations aimed at protecting American personnel and preventing Iran from advancing toward nuclear capability do not constitute open-ended war." [4] "Targeted operations." We have 13 dead service members. Iran's supreme leader was killed in the opening hours. The conflict has spread to more than a dozen neighboring countries. The Strait of Hormuz is mined. And Rep. Biggs would like you to know this is not, technically, a war. His fellow co-founder of the War Powers Caucus, Rep. David Schweikert (R-AZ), also voted to let the hostilities continue. Pressed on how this squared with his longstanding position that "the power to declare war rests exclusively with Congress, not the Executive branch," he declined to elaborate [4]. Both men are running for governor in Arizona's July primary. Both need Trump's base. This is what it looks like when political survival meets constitutional conviction, and political survival wins.

Hawley's Right Instinct, Wrong Framing

To his credit, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) was the first prominent Trump ally to say publicly what a lot of Republicans were thinking privately: it is time to wind this down. "Now it is time to declare victory," Hawley told Fox News on March 10th. "This has been absolutely amazing. It has been astounding, historic." He pointed to the destruction of Iran's nuclear infrastructure, its ballistic missile stockpile, and its navy as markers of an unambiguous success [3]. Hawley is right that the military has performed magnificently. He is right that the objectives, as stated, have largely been achieved. And he is right that there is real political danger in letting "a few weeks" become "whatever it takes." But the framing matters. Hawley's call to declare victory reads primarily as midterm risk management — every House member and a third of the Senate faces reelection in November, and a protracted war that is driving up gas prices while the DHS sits unfunded is not anyone's preferred campaign backdrop [5]. Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) put it plainly: "Nobody wants that. The President does not. I certainly do not," adding that a prolonged conflict could have effects on the 2026 midterms. That is an honest statement. It would be more impressive as a constitutional argument.

What Real Constitutional Conservatism Looks Like

Here is the thing that gets lost in the partisan fog: demanding congressional authorization is not an argument against this war. It is an argument for doing it right. If Trump's Iran policy is as justified as his supporters claim — and there are legitimate grounds for that claim — then it should be able to withstand a congressional debate. Authorization would have strengthened the mission, created shared political ownership, and produced the kind of democratic legitimacy that distinguishes a republic from an executive monarchy. Instead, Congress was briefed after the fact by a Secretary of State who offered shifting explanations and then walked them back the next day. "The president determined we were not going to get hit first," Rubio said. "It is that simple, guys." [2] That is not how the framers designed this to work, and conservatives of all people should know it. The entire constitutional architecture of war powers — Congress declares, the executive prosecutes — exists precisely because the founders had seen what unchecked executive war-making looked like. They built in friction deliberately. The conservative instinct toward executive strength is understandable. It is even correct in some contexts. But it should not extend to a blank check for military action of this magnitude, conducted without the deliberative process that a constitutional republic demands. Some colleagues who write about such things with great progressive enthusiasm might finally agree on this point — though I would note their concern seems considerably more vigorous when the president in question is of the opposing party. [1]

The Accountability Deficit

The House voted 219-212 against a resolution forcing Trump to end hostilities with Iran. The Senate voted 53-47 to block a similar measure. Two votes. That is it. That is the formal legislative engagement with a war that has killed 13 Americans, sent oil prices to triple digits, and prompted Defense Secretary Hegseth to float timelines ranging from "a few days" to "eight weeks" to whatever the current estimate happens to be [5]. Sen. Mitch McConnell, in a rare floor speech, at least tried to provide strategic context — noting that the Iranian axis connects to Russia and China, that Ukraine's cooperation matters, and that supplemental defense funding should be treated as a strategic priority regardless of one's view of the war itself. That is the kind of substantive engagement that war powers debate should generate. Speaker Mike Johnson has signaled he wants Congress focused on the voting law legislation Trump is pushing. The message to lawmakers: eyes on the domestic agenda, let the president handle the Middle East. That is not a governing philosophy. That is an abdication. When November comes and candidates need to explain gas prices, service member casualties, and an open-ended conflict with no clearly defined endpoint, the members of Congress who voted to sideline themselves will have to own that record. Voters have a way of noticing when the people they sent to Washington declined to do the job.

Two Things Can Be True

Iran was a genuine threat. The military campaign, on its stated objectives, achieved extraordinary results. The men and women who carried it out deserve every commendation they receive. And: Congress should have been consulted before the first bombs fell. The War Powers Act should not be treated as a suggestion. And "targeted operations" is not a credible semantic escape hatch when the supreme leader of a sovereign nation-state is killed in the opening salvo. These are not contradictory positions. Conservatives who believe in constitutional government should be the loudest voices insisting on both. Hawley's instinct to end this cleanly and declare victory is right. But the lesson of the last three weeks should not just be "let us get out before the midterms." It should be "let us not do this again without the constitutional process that makes American military power legitimate in the eyes of our own citizens." The Constitution does not take a partisan exemption. Neither should we.